State Responsibility and Climate Change: Could Canada be Liable to Small Island States? by Barton, Phillip
Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 
Volume 11 Article 3 
1-1-2002 
State Responsibility and Climate Change: Could Canada be Liable 
to Small Island States? 
Phillip Barton 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/djls 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 3.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Phillip Barton, "State Responsibility and Climate Change: Could Canada be Liable to Small Island States? " 
(2002) 11 Dal J Leg Stud 65. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For 





Volume 11, 2002 
Please note that Figure 2 and Figure 3 are 
reversed in "State Responsibility and Climate Change: Could 
Canada be Liable to Small Island States?" by Philip Barton. 
Figure 3, which appears on page 82 should appear on page 80 
as Figure 2 and Figure 2 on page 80 should appear on page 82 
as Figure 3. 
We apologize for this error. 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY ... 65 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: 
COULD CANADA BE LIABLE TO SMALL ISLAND STATES? 
PHILLIP BARTONI 
ABSTRACT 
The projections of human-induced climate change by the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change have many low-lying island nations 
gravely concerned about their vulnerabilities to sea-level rise and ex-
treme weather. Small island states jointly contribute less than 1 % of 
global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions annually yet may experience 
some of the most severe consequences of climate change. This article 
investigates whether Canada could be liable if one of these nations turns 
to the International Comi of Justice (ICJ) to compensate for environ-
mental impacts flowing from GHG emissions. Given the unce1iainty in 
the liability standard that would be applied by the ICJ in a claim of state 
responsibility, this article assesses whether Canada would be liable on 
the more strict standard of culpability than strict liability that of 
negligence. If the theory of "market share liability" were applied to the 
negligent portion of Canada's contribution to global GHG emissions 
( cun-ently less than 2% ), the percentage apportioning of damages could 
still be an enormous future liability. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There is currently an international scientific consensus that the 
impacts of climate change are now being experienced around the world 
and these impacts are projected to become increasingly worse in the 
years to come: 
I Philip Barton graduated from University of British Columbia with a Bachelor of Applied 
Science in Environmental Engineering in 1996 and a Master of Applied Science in Civil 
Engineering in 2000. He will graduate from Dalhousie Law School with an LLB in 2003 and 
promises that it will be his final degree. He has been involved in climate change for nearly five 
years and hopes the future will allow him to continue work in the complex legal aspects of that 
field. Please send comments to pkbarton@hotmail.com. 
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... we support the [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's] 
conclusion that is it at least 90% certain that temperatures will con-
tinue to rise, with average global surface temperature projected to 
increase by between 1.4° and 5.8°C above 1990 by 2100. This increase 
will be accompanied by rising sea levels; more intense precipitation 
events in some countries and increased risk of drought in others; and 
adverse effects on agriculture, health and water resources .... It is now 
evident that human activities are already contributing to global climate 
change .... The balance of scientific evidence demands effective steps 
now to avert damaging changes to Earth's climate. 1 
This global concern results from the fact that human activities have 
increased the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases to un-
precedented levels. The atmospheric concentration of the main green-
house gas (GHG), carbon dioxide (C0),2 has increased 31 % over pre-
industrial levels; for several thousand years the concentration of CO 2 
was 280 ppm ±10 ppm but has risen to 367 ppm in 1999 and continues to 
increase by 1.5 ppm each year. 3 It is important to recognize that the 
"present C02 concentration has not been exceeded during the past 
420,000 years and likely [66-90% probability] not during the past 20 
million years."4 It is generally believed that GHGs contribute to in-
creases in the planet's temperature. During the 20111 century, the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that the global 
surface temperature has increased by about 0.6°C and that "it is very 
likely [90-99% probability] that the 1990s was the warn1est decade and 
1 A joint statement issued by the Australian Academy of Sciences, Royal Flemish Academy of 
Belgium for Sciences and the Arts, Brazilian Academy of Sciences, Royal Society of Canada, 
Caribbean Academy of Sciences, Chinese Academy of Sciences, French Academy of Sci-
ences, German Academy of Natural Scientists Leopoldina, Indian National Science Academy, 
Indonesian Academy of Sciences, Royal Irish Academy, Accademia Nazionale <lei Lincei 
(Italy), Academy of Sciences Malaysia, Academy Council of the Royal Society of New 
Zealand, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Turkish Academy of Sciences, and Royal 
Society (UK) on May 18, 2001 in Science 292(1261) 
2 This article refers to greenhouse gases (GHGs) as a proxy for all six of the greenhouse gases 
which are the focus of the Kyoto Protocol but for simplicity will only focus on carbon dioxide. 
See: Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention 011 Climate Change, 11 
Dec 1997, (1998), 37 Int. Leg. Mat. 32, [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
3 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Climate Change 200 I: The Scient{flc Basis. 
Contribution of Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, ed. by J.T. Houghton, Y.Ding, D.J. Griggs, M. Noguer, P.J. van der 
Linden, X. Dai, K. Maskell, and C.A. Johnson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2001) at 185. 
4 Ibid. at 7. 
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199 8 the warmest year in the instrumental record, since 1861. "5 The 
IPCC estimates that the spring and summer sea-ice extent in the North-
ern Hemisphere has decreased by about 10 to 15% since the 1950's and 
that "there has been widespread retreat of mountain glaciers in non-polar 
regions during the 20th century."6 In the latest IPCC scientific assess-
ment report, scientists estimate that the global average sea level rose 
between 0.1 and 0.2 meters during the 2Qth centu1y. In addition to 
investigating the past and cmTent climate for signs of human interfer-
ence, the IPCC also projects the future consequences of continuing 
down the current path of doing nothing to reduce current GHG emission 
levels. 
In order to estimate climate change at the end of this century, the 
IPCC has developed over 30 future scenarios which estimate global 
GHG emissions to the year 2100.7 These scenarios were created by 
making a variety of different assumptions on the three most important 
forces affecting GHG emissions: population growth, socio-economic 
development and technological change. But all of these scenarios have 
one thing in common - they assume that no nations undertake any 
climate change initiatives to reduce GHG emissions. This translates into 
projections that by 2100, atmospheric co2 will be at least 540 ppm and 
could be as high as 970 ppm (between 90% and 250% greater than the 
preindustrial level of 280 ppm).8 When the full range of these emission 
scenarios are programmed into the sophisticated climate models in use 
today, the projected changes between 1990 and 2100 are that: 
global mean surface temperature will increase at least l.4°C 
and as much as 5.8°C9 
• global mean sea level will rise between 0.09 and 0.88 meters 
(due primarily to the thermal expansion of the oceans and the 
loss of mass from glaciers and ice caps) 10 
5 Supra note 3 at 2. 
6 Supra note 3 at 4. 
7 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Emission Scenarios: A Special Report of 
Working Group III of the Intergovemmental Panel on Clil1late Change - Sul1llllaJ)' .for 
Policymakers, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 3. 
8 Supra note 3 at 12. 
9 Supra note 3 at 13. 
10 Supra note 3 at 16. 
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• peak wind intensities in tropical cyclones will likely increase 11 
• mean and peak precipitation intensities in tropical cyclones will 
likely increase 12 
Furthermore, "global mean surface temperature increases and rising 
sea level from thermal expansion of the ocean are projected to continue 
for hundreds of years after stabilization of greenhouse gas concentra-
tions (even at present levels), owing to the long timescales on which the 
deep ocean adjusts to climate change." 13 Therefore, the earth may 
already be committed to some degree of climatic changes regardless of 
whether any climate policy initiatives get implemented. 
The scenarios and projections demonstrate that if GHG emissions by 
the world's nations are not severely reduced, the atmospheric concentra-
tions of greenhouse gases will continue to rise and continue to upset the 
planet's natural the1mostat. Without these sharp emission reductions, 
the small island states of the world may incur severe environmental 
impacts such as sea-level rise and increased frequency and severity of 
extreme weather events such as tropical cyclones. 
The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) was fonned in 1990 to 
argue for these sharp emission reductions. The Alliance now has 43 
members and has voiced loud concern at international climate change 
negotiations. 14 This coalition has been strenuously arguing for, inter 
alia, strong international community adoption of the Precautionary 
Principle from Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development. 15 The essence of this principle is that nations should 
take appropriate action now if there is a future risk of environmental 
harm - lack of full scientific certainty should not stand in the way of 
preventative action. 
While the international climate negotiations have seen some suc-
cess, global GHG emissions have continued to rise. This limited success 
includes the creation of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
11 Supra note 3 at 15. But the future changes in tropical cyclone location and frequency are 
uncertain. 
12 Supra note 3 at 15. 
13 Supra note 3 at 17. 
14 Alliance of Small Island States. Backgrounder. <http://www.sidsnet.org/aosis/ 
background.html> 
15 Rio Declaratio11 011 Environment a11d Development. U.N. Doc.A/CONF.151/5/Rev. I; 
(1992), 31 Int. Leg. Mat. 874. 
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Climate Change 16 (of which the ultimate objective is "stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system") and the 
development of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. 17 However, the present reality 
is that the GHG emissions of most nations have continued to rise and 
global fossil fuel GHG emissions have increased 8% between 1990 and 
1998 (from 6096 to 6608 million metric tonnes of carbon). 18 Fm1her-
more, it is still highly uncertain whether the Kyoto Protocol's average 
emission reductions of at least 5% below 1990 levels by 2008 to 2012 
will ever be successfully attained. 19 
AOSIS wants the international community to adopt strong policy 
measures now to curtail emissions, prevent the onset of serious climate 
change and thereby prevent further damage to their vulnerable small 
island states. AOSIS wants nations to adopt the Precautionary Principle 
so that effective action is taken before damage occurs.20 Indeed, there 
may be legal incentive for nations to do so. 
Should the trend of GHG emissions continue to the point where 
small island states suffer, members of AOSIS may tum to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) to obtain compensation for the harms they 
have suffered as a result of climate change.21 The objective of this ai1icle 
is to assess whether Canada could be liable for the transboundary 
environmental damage induced by climate change. The first part of this 
1" United Nations Framework Co11ve11tio11 on Climate Change. C.T.S. 199417; UNTS 1771/ 
107. 
17 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2. The Kyoto Protocol is an international treaty in which 
industrialized countries commit to reduce their national GHG emission levels by an average of 
5.2% below the levels that existed in 1990. However, this treaty has not been ratified by the 
required minimum of nations so has yet to enter into force. 
18 G. Marland, T.A. Boden & R.J. Andres, "Global, Regional, and National CO, Emissions" in 
Trends: A Compendium of Data 011 Global Change (Oak Ridge, Tenn: Carbon Dioxide 
Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, United States Department of 
Energy, 200 I). <http://cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/trends/emis> 
19 S. Oberthur & H.E. Ott, The Kyoto Protocol: !11ternatio11al Climate Policy .for the 21'' 
Centw:v. (Heidelberg, Germany: Springer-Verlag, 1999) at 121. 
20 Supra note 14. The possibility of harmed countries suing those states responsible has been 
the speculation of several academics. 
21 D. Zaelke & J. Cameron, "Global Warming and Climate Change - An Overview of the 
International Legal Process" (1990) 5 Am. U.J. Int'! L. & Pol'y 236; M. Mackinnon, "Poor 
nations hurt by rich might have legal case" The Globe and Mail, July 12, 200lat A8 (this 
article includes speculation by Andrew Strauss, a law professor at Widener University, 
Delaware, U.S.A.). 
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article reviews the cases, declarations and treaties which exist in the area 
of environmental state responsibility. As a result of the uncertainty in 
the liability standard that would applied by the ICJ - the second part of 
this article investigates if Canada could be liable by a higher degree of 
culpability than strict liability - that of negligence. If liable negligently, 
one would be responsible on the basis of strict liability as well. It is 
important for policy-makers to recognize that their decisions today 
could result in future liability. 
To analyse Canada's liability, this article supposes a legal claim 
being made at the ICJ by Palau, a sovereign nation and member of 
AOSIS in the South Pacific, consisting of 200 islands which vary from 
numerous low-lying coral islands to a 400-foot elevation on the main 
island. (Palau has a current population of 19,000 on an area of only 488 
square kilometers).22 Although Palau might be able to pursue a claim 
against Canada in Canadian court jurisdiction, this article does not 
pursue that possibility. Moreover, while GHG emissions are in fact 
produced by private persons within Canada's jurisdiction, this article 
uses Canada as the relevant legal actor.23 
I. ST A TE RESPONSIBILITY 
The first pa1i of this article reviews the international law of state 
responsibility with an emphasis on Tran boundary environmental issues. 
This is followed by an examination of the applicable liability standard 
for state responsibility. 
For Palau to bring a claim against Canada at the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) both countries have to recognize the jurisdiction of this 
court to adjudicate their dispute. Canada now recognizes the jurisdiction 
22 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fae/book-Palau. <www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ 
factbook/geos/ps.html> 
23 The essence of this issue is whether Canada could be responsible for failing in its duty to 
control the conduct of its nationals, whether citizens or corporations, of emitting greenhouse 
gas emissions. The draft articles of the International Law Commission, Responsibility o.lStates 
for Intemationally Wrong/id Acts, specify attribution to states in Articles 4 to 11 but these are 
largely for the conduct of government organs or the conduct of persons empowered to exercise 
government authority [ (200 I) Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
53rd Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev. l .]. 
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of the ICJ and the latest declaration was submitted in 1994.24 However, 
an unfortunate reality of the ICJ is that this recognition is voluntary and 
could be removed at any time. While Palau has not submitted a declara-
tion recognizing ICJ jurisdiction it is free to do so at any time because it 
became a member of the United Nations on December 15, 1994.25 
Article 93(1) of the Charter of the United Nations provides that all 
members automatically become parties to the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice and Article 35(1) of this Statute states that the ICJ 
is available to all states that are parties. 
It is important to note that Palau would have to make the claim in the 
ICJ because there is no binding dispute resolution mechanisms included 
in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC).26 While Canada ratified this Convention in 1992 to be 
enforceable in 1994,27 even if Canada violates its ultimate objective 
("stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system"), there is no opportunity for Palau to have any recourse 
under the terms of the Convention.28 
Palau might bring a claim of state responsibility to the ICJ because it 
is a long-standing principle of international law that one state shall not 
damage another's environment. This principle was affirmed in the fa-
mous Trail Smelter Arbitration29 where the United States claimed that 
serious environmental damages were resulting from the sulphur dioxide 
emissions of a smelter immediately across the border in Trail, British 
24 The Canadian declaration recognizing the jurisdiction of the ICJ can be found at the Court's 
website: <www.icj-cij.org/icjwww /ibas icdocuments/ibasictext/i bas icdeclarations.htm>. 
However, Canada has reserved the right to withhold compulsory jurisdiction for complaints 
with other Commonwealth nations. As a result, some small island states will be prevented 
from using this avenue. 
25 Information available at the website for the International Court of Justice. <www.icj-cij.org/ 
icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicUNmembers.html> 
2" Supra note 16. 
27 Supra note 16. 
28 In contrast, Articles 279 through 296 of the U11ited Nations Conve11tio11 on the Law of the 
Sea (UN Doc. AICONF.621122 (1982)) imposes dispute resolution on parties which is 
involuntary and binding. It should be mentioned that an argument might be possible that sea-
level rise is damage to the coastal zone marine environment thereby allowing Palau to make 
use of these dispute resolution mechanisms. This possibility will not be examined in this 
paper. 
29 Trail Smelter Arbitration: United States v. Canada. (1931-1941 ), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905. 
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Columbia. The tribunal declared that: 
Under the principles of international law ... no State has the right to use 
or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause [environ-
mental] injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the proper-
ties of persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the 
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence. 
An important development in this principle of international law was its 
inclusion in the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 of which Canada was a 
signatory. Principle 21 states: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their 
own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.30 
Also, Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment includes a virtually identical restatement of this concept.31 
The underlying concept of both Stockholm Principle 21 and Rio 
Principle 2 is that while sovereign states are free to exploit their re-
sources, states are responsible if their activities damage the environ-
ments of other states. In terms of the scope of this article, this concept 
may be expressed more narrowly as: Canada is free to exploit its fossil 
fuel resources but must not cause significant climate change-induced 
impacts to Palau.32 It is important to recognize that this concept is 
included in the preamble to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change and so can fairly be considered a component of the 
international law smTounding the climate change issue. 
1. Liability Standard 
Before determining whether Canada would be responsible to Palau 
for environmental hann, the appropriate method for deciding state liabil-
30 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference 011 the Human Environment. 1972. 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 Rev. I. [emphasis added]. 
31 Supra note 15. 
32 The threshold at which environmental state responsibility applies is uncertain - Stockholm 
Principle 21 and Rio Principle 2 do not define the threshold but Trail Smelter specified 
"serious consequence'. Nevertheless, it is likely that damage must be at least significant to 
violate these principles. 
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ity must be discussed. There are three generally accepted standards by 
which liability can be determined for accidental harm.33 In decreasing 
burden on the plaintiff, these three standards are: 
subjective knowledge of the risk of haim - subjective fault 
negligence - objective fault 
strict/absolute liability - no fault with few or no defences 
available 
Unfortunately there is little agreement as to the applicable standard in 
the context of international liability34 and very few state liability claims 
dealing with Tran boundary pollution have actually arisen. The first 
standard, subjective fault, would be the most difficult for the plaintiff to 
establish. This was the standard used by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel35 
dispute where the court had to determine whether Albania had knowl-
edge of the mines which caused the damage to British warships. The 
court stated that it is "every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its 
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states". Since 
the court required that Albania have knowledge of the mines, this is 
subjective fault, which is more difficult to prove than proving that 
Albania ought to have known- the objective standard. 
The boundary between strict and absolute liability is unclear because 
some of the several possible definitions for strict liability overlap those 
for absolute liability. Strict liability may be liability from simply caus-
ing harm, or it may include the imposition of an onus on the defendant to 
prove that they weren't negligent. 36 The former essentially defines 
absolute liability for there are no defences available once causation is 
proved, while the latter allows a defence of due diligence. The less 
onerous strict liability standard which incorporates the due diligence 
33 The possibility of a country intentionally causing climate change is not considered here 
this paper assumes that only the liability standards for accidental harm are important. 
34 J. Bmnnee, "The Responsibility of States for Environmental Harm in a Multinational 
Context - Problems and Trends" (1993) 34 Les Cahiers de Droit 827 at 835. 
35 Corfi1 Channel Case (Merits): United Kingdom v. Albania, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 17-23. 
[emphasis added] 
36 P.W. Birnie & A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1992) at 143; G. Hand!, "International Liability of States for Marine Pollution" ( 1983) 
Can. Y.B. Int'! Law 85 at 94; L.F.E Goldie, "Concepts of Strict and Absolute Liability and the 
Ranking of Liability in Terms of Relative Exposure to Risk" (1985) Neth. Y.B. Int'! Law 175 
at 194. 
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defence can be distinguished from the negligence standard by recogniz-
ing that negligence requires the plaint?ff to establish the lack of dili-
gence. Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration37 and Principle 2 of 
the Rio Declaration38 are capable of being interpreted as either strict or 
absolute liability39 - as an "obligation of due diligence or as one of 
unqualified prevention of harm."40 In the Trail Smelter Arbitration41 , it 
appears that the standard was absolute liability because if the case was of 
"serious consequence" (a threshold question) and the injury was estab-
lished by "clear and convincing evidence" then the defendant (Canada) 
was to be found liable regardless of any fault. However, as several 
academics have noted, the actual standard was not conclusively deter-
mined in this case because Canada agreed, in advance, to the imposition 
of liability if causation alone was proved.42 
Absolute liability finds it origins in the famous case of Rylands v. 
Fletcher43 where the "non-natural use" of land imposed liability if any 
water escaped onto neighbouring lands regardless of fault. 44 Absolute 
liability also exists in international law. In the 1972 Convention on 
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,45 it is 
stated that "A launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compen-
sation for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth 
... "Based on this Convention, Canada successfully pursued the Cosmos 
954 Claim46 against the U.S.S.R. for compensation when their nuclear 
satellite disintegrated above northern Canada in 1978. 
The nearly fifty years of effort by the International Law Commission 
(ILC) to establish a treaty on state responsibility also offers little assis-
37 Supra note 30. 
38 Supra note 15. 
39 P.W. Birnie & A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1992) at 91 to 95. 
40 Ibid. at 143. 
41 Supra note 29. 
42 Supra note 36 at 145; See also: J. Brunnee, Acid Rain and Ozone Layer Depletion: 
International Law and Regulation (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1988) at 118. 
43 (1868), LR 3 HL 330 (HL). 
44 However, confosion can result because available literature can refer to this as one of strict 
liability. For example: E.J. Weinrib, Tort Law: Cases and Materials (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery Publications, 1997) at 531; E.L. Hughes, A.R. Lucas & W.A. Tilleman, Environ-
mental Law and Policy 2nd ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 1998) at 97. 
45 Convention on lntemational Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 29 March 
1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 1987. 
46 Cosmos 954 Claim (Canada v. US.SR.), (1979), 18 Int. Leg. Mat. 899. 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY ... 75 
tance in determining the appropriate standard. Article 12 in the latest 
version of the draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Interna-
tionally Wrongful Acts47 states: 
There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act 
of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that 
obligation, regardless of its origin or character.48 
Determining breaches based on "what is required ... by that obligation" 
is not possible with any certainty without knowing what is actually 
required. One could argue that perhaps the obligation is Principle 2 of 
the Rio Declaration49 - that of strict liability. However, both Stockholm 
and Rio are non-legally binding "soft law" and the only case law 
available is Trail Smelter - a case over 60 years old. While some 
academics50 express the view that the Stockholm, Principle 21 represents 
an existing rule of customary international law and thus a binding 
obligation, the limited international practice prevents any conclusive 
determination that it is the applicable standard for Tran boundary envi-
ronmental damage. 51 
What about negligence established through proof of objective fault? 
Negligence is the standard overwhelmingly used for private injury 
claims in common law jurisdictions. While no state liability claims have 
been determined based on the negligence standard, the ICJ can utilize 
the "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" as per-
mitted under Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice. 52 Since the negligence standard is currently being used by many 
nations which would likely be characterized as "civilized", the same 
standard could rightly be adopted in future state responsibility claims.53 
At present it is not clear what the applicable standard would be if 
Palau brought a claim against Canada at the ICJ. Because of this 
47 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrong/it! Acts. (2001) Report of the Interna-
tional Law Commission on the Work of its 53"1 Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev. I. 
48 Ibid. [emphasis added]. 
49 Supra note 15. 
50 A. Kiss & D. Shelton, International Environmental Law (U.S.A.: Transnational Publishers, 
I 99 I) at 130-131. 
51 Supra note 34 and note 39 at 143. 
52 Statute of the lntemational Court of.Justice, 26 June 1945, C.T.S. 1945/7, p. 48. 
53 An important "general principle of law" which would complete an analysis of the possibili-
ties for incorporation into the liability standard used by the ICJ is the civil law's equivalent of 
negligence law. However, that investigation is outside the scope of this paper. 
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uncertainty, the second part of this article investigates Canada's liability 
according to the standard requiring a greater degree of culpability than 
that of strict or absolute liability - negligence based on proof of objec-
tive fault. If Canada can be made liable on negligence then Canada must 
also be liable on strict liability. 
II. N EGLI GEN CE 
The first part of the aiiicle reviewed the status of state responsibility 
in the environmental context and concluded with the possibility of 
negligence being a liability standard applied in the future. Using the 
negligence standard, this second part of the article investigates whether 
Canada could be liable to Palau for the damages resulting from climate 
change. The relevant time to consider the liability is sometime in the 
indefinite future, when climate change is seriously impacting Palau. 
This part of the paper is divided into four components: duty of care, 
standard of care, causation and damage compensation. 
1. Duty of Care 
The first step in any negligence claim is to establish that A owes a 
duty of care to B. This duty of care is defined by the boundaries of 
reasonable foreseeability of the risk of harm - the objective test.54 It 
must be reasonably foreseeable that A's conduct creates a risk of harm to 
B. Therefore the question for this paper can be expressed as is it 
reasonably.foreseeable that Canada's continued release of GHG eniis-
sions, with the knowledge that other nations are also emitting GHGs, 
will result in climate change induced impacts to Palau? 
The state of the scientific understanding as presented in the introduc-
tion is essentially: GHGs trap heat on earth, their atmospheric concen-
trations are increasing because of annual global carbon emissions ap-
proaching 7 billion tonnes, and scientists believe the 21st century will 
experience temperature increases as a result of the change in GHG 
concentration. Canada recognizes the concern over GHGs. In fact, one 
of the first international climate change conferences was held in Toronto 
54 M'Alister (or Donoghue) v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL); Palsgrqf v. Long Island 
Railroad Co. 1928 162 NE 99 (NYCA); Haynes v. Harwood [1935] 1KB146 (CA). 
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in 1988.55 Furthermore, many Canadian scientists are authors ofIPCC 
reports and have been actively researching the climate change-induced 
impacts that may occur in Canada.56 
The nature of GHG emissions is that they become fully mixed in the 
atmosphere almost immediately and thus any states' contribution fuels 
the global climate change experienced by all. Canada is releasing GHGs 
with knowledge of the risk of environmental consequences and knowl-
edge that other nations are doing the same. These risks of harm include 
projections from the IPCC that global mean surface temperature will 
increase at least l.4°C and as much as 5.8°C, global mean sea level will 
rise between 0.09 and 0.88 meters from 1990 to 2100 (resulting in 
significant land loss in small island states) and that there is likely to be 
an increase in the peak wind and mean and weak precipitation intensities 
of tropical cyclones.57 The likely increase in wind and precipitation 
intensities has been estimated by the IPCC with a probability between 
66 and 90% and some researchers have estimated that in the absence of 
climate-mitigation policies, warming between l.7°C and 4.7°C has a 
90% probability.58 These increases could result in risk to human life, 
coastal erosion and damage to coastal buildings and infrastructure and 
damage to coastal ecosystems such as coral reefs and mangroves.59 
55 This was the World Meteorological Organization's Conference on Climate Change in 1988 
referred to in: C. Rolfe, Turning Down the Heat: Emissions Trading and Canadian Implemen-
tation of the Kyoto Protocol (Vancouver: West Coast Environmental Law Research Founda-
tion, 1998) at 57. 
56 Environment Canada. 1990. Implications of Climate Change for Small Coastal Communi-
ties in Atlantic Canada. Climate Change Digest CCD 90-01; Environment Canada. 1988. 
Socio-Economic Assessment of the Physical and Ecological Impacts ()[Climate Change on the 
Marine Environment ()[the Atlantic Region ()[Canada Phase I. Climate Change Digest CCD 
88-07; Environment Canada. 1988. Prelimina1y Study ()[the Possible Impacts of a One Meter 
Rise in Sea Level at Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island. Climate Change Digest CCD 88-
02; Environment Canada. 1987. Effects of a One Meter Rise in Mean Sea-Level at Saint John, 
New Brunswick, and the Lower Reaches ()[the Saint John River. Climate Change Digest CCD 
87-04. 
57 Supra note 3 at 15. 
58 T.M.L. Wigley & S.C.B. Raper. "Interpretation of High Projections for Global-Mean 
Warming" (2001) 293 Science 451. 
59 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, 
and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report ()f the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. by J.J. McCarthy, O.F. Canziani, N.A. 
Leary, D.J. Dokken & K.S. White (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 7. 
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There is little difficulty with the assertion that sea level rise is 
reasonably foreseeable. In fact, Environment Canada has recently com-
pleted a study of the impacts of sea-level rise on the coast of Prince 
Edward Island - this province has been "identified as one of the regions 
most sensitive to sea-level rise in Canada."60 One of the findings of the 
authors is that if a stonn with the same magnitude of the one on January 
21, 2000, occurs again when there is an assumed 0.5 m sea-level rise, 
over $200 million of property in Charlottetown would be at risk of 
flooding. Given the IPCC projections of future climate change, the 
ongoing research of Canadian scientists and potential risks to low-lying 
island states, it appears that it would be difficult for Canada to argue that 
it was not reasonably foreseeable that continued GHG emissions would 
contribute to climate change. 
2. Standard of Care 
One breaches the standard of care owed to others if one does not 
satisfy the standard required of the situation. The test to determine the 
standard of care is the objective test developed in Vaughan v. Menlove61 
- did A take reasonable care in regards to the duty owed to B? The 
specific question for this component of the negligence claim is thus did 
Canada take reasonable care in regards to Palau given the scientific 
understanding of the risks of climate change that was available at the 
time? 
This question should be addressed by first reviewing Canada's past 
emissions and projected business-as-usual emissions. Figure 1 to the 
right presents Canada's emissions since 1990 and the most recent pro-
jections to 2010.62 
60 Environment Canada, Natural Resources Canada, Rodshaw Environmental Consulting, 
Canadian Department of Fisheries & Oceans, Department of Oceanography (Dalhousie Uni-
versity), Applied Geomatics Research Group (Nova Scotia Community College), City of 
Charlottetown and PEI Emergency Measures Organization .. Coastal Impacts of Climate 
Change and Sea-Level Rise on Prince Edward Island. Synthesis Report. 2001. Climate 
Change Action Fund project CCAF A04 l. 
61 (1837), 132 ER 490 (CP). 
62 Actual Emissions: Pollution Data Branch, Environment Canada. August 200 I. I 990 to 1999 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Estimates for Canada. <www.ec.gc.ca/pdb> 
Projected Emissions: Analysis and Modelling Group - National Climate Change Process, 
Canada's Emissions Outlook: An Update, National Climate Change Process, December 1999. 
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Canada's emissions have steadily increased from 612 million tonnes 
in 1990 to 704 million tonnes in 2000 and have been projected to 
increase further still to 764 million tonnes if no climate policy initiatives 
are undertaken. 
Figure 1 provides a straight-line representation of the emissions 
reductions necessary for Canada to succeed in its commitments to the 
Kyoto Protocol - a 6% reduction below what the emissions were in 1990 
by the period between 2008 and 2012 (or an annual emission of 571 
million tonnes in 2010).63 Given the international concern over GHGs, it 
is definitely unacceptable for Canada's emissions to continue as they 
have been projected. Reasonable care necessitates emissions reductions 
otherwise Canada would be in breach of its standard of care to Palau. 
But what is reasonable care? Is it Kyoto and similar future manifesta-
tions of Kyoto or is it far greater reductions? 
It is illustrative to look at the history of reduction commitments 
before the Kyoto Protocol ever existed. The World Meteorological 
Organization's Toronto Conference on Climate Change in 1988 recom-
mended reducing co2 below 1988 levels by the year 2005 (and in 1988 
the IPCC was established by the World Meteorological Organization 
and the United Nations Environment Programme).64 Two years later, at 
6J Supra note 2. 
64 C. Rolfe, Turning Down the Heat: Emissions Trading and Canadia11 lmple111e11tation of the 
Kyoto Protocol (Vancouver: West Coast Environmental Law Research Foundation, 1998) at 
57. 
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the Second World Climate Conference, the federal government commit-
ted Canada to stabilizing emissions of GHGs at 1990 levels by 2000.65 
However in 1991, the House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Environment recommended a 20% reduction by 2005 and this was 
repeated in the 1993 Liberal "Red Book" (which stated the aim of 20% 
reduction from 1988 levels by 2005). 66 It was in the 1992 Rio Earth 
Summit that Canada again agreed to return to 1990 levels by 2000.67 All 
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Canada's Kyoto commitment should not be accepted as the defini-
tion of "reasonable care". The fact that other industrialized countries 
have similar commitments is also not evidence of reasonable care be-
cause everyone could be negligent.69 Rather, reasonable care is defined 
by the conduct that is required given the available scientific understand-
ing of the potential risks. The international negotiations that created the 
65 Ibid. at 64. 
66 Supra note 64 at 64. 
67 Supra note 64 at 64. 
68 However, the 20% reduction below I 988 levels has been presented as a 20% reduction 
below I 990 levels because this author has been unable to find any pre- I 990 data. 
69 The prevailing custom by all countries could be negligent as in The T.J. Hooper, 60 F2d 737 
(2d Cir. 1932), where the court found that the custom of all tug owners in not carrying radios 
constituted negligence. 
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Kyoto Protocol have little or no connection with the current scientific 
understanding. If the commitments were derived from the risk of harm, 
they would have been made for much greater reductions. Dutch re-
searchers have estimated that to keep sea-level rise less then 0.4 meters 
by 2100, emissions reductions between 3 7 and 64% below 1990 levels 
by 2010 would be necessary (far greater than any of the existing Kyoto 
commitments). 7° Furthermore, researchers have estimated that even 
with a fully implemented Kyoto, warming by 2050 "would be only 
about 1/20 of a degree less than what is projected by the IPCC. "71 As a 
result, even if Canada satisfies Kyoto and makes further similar commit-
ments, reasonable care might demand greater action. Therefore Canada 
could still be in breach of its standard of care. 
The AOSIS coalition has been attempting to persuade the interna-
tional community to adopt stronger commitments since its creation. In a 
claim before the ICJ, Palau might argue that the high risk of environ-
mental consequences to their nation necessitates far greater reductions, 
for instance 30% below 1990 by 2005 with a straight line continued into 
the future. 
While in this hypothetical claim, Canada and Palau will likely have 
vastly different interpretations of what defines reasonable care, the only 
critical interpretation is the one determined by the ICJ. Recognizing that 
the scientific understanding of the risks of climate change is constantly 
evolving with continuous advances, how can reasonable care be deter-
mined? One appropriate manner to determine the standard of care may 
be in the following iterative steps:72 
1. Given the international scientific understanding available in 
1990, what does reasonable care require Canada's emissions to 
be in 1991? 
2. Given the international scientific understanding available in 
1991, what does reasonable care require Canada's emissions to 
be in 1992? 
3. Given the international scientific understanding available in 
(x), what does reasonable care require Canada's emissions to 
be in (x+l)? 
70 Supra note 64 at 64. 
71 Supra note 59 at 855. 
72 This article limits analysis of conduct to the post-1990 period. 
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This iterative process would be a just manner in which to develop a 
"reasonable care" line. This reasonable care line could then be plotted 
alongside Canada's emissions projections and Kyoto commitments. 
This is presented below in Figure 3.73 Assuming that Canada satisfies 
Kyoto and that reasonable care requires even lower emission levels, all 
emissions in excess of reasonable care (above the line) are in breach of 
the negligence standard and all emissions below reasonable care are 
consistent with the negligence standard. 
Figure 3. Comparing Reasonable Care & Kyoto 
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Figure 3 illustrates that ifreasonable care is continued into the future 
then emissions reach zero in 2040. However, if Kyoto is simply contin-
ued, Canada is still emitting over 300 million tonnes in 2040. While the 
reasonable care line in Figure 3 maybe quite different from what the ICJ 
would determine, as long as reasonable care is below Kyoto then emis-
sions in excess are the result of Canada's negligence. This apportion-
ment of Canada's GHG emissions into discrete negligent and non-
negligent portions is important because it is unlikely that all of Canada's 
73 Figure 3 assumes that reasonable care was a 30% reduction below 1990 levels by 2005 and 
the business-as-usual and Kyoto commitment lines are simply continuations to 2040 from 
their trend in 2010. 
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GHG emissions would be considered negligent - the sources of energy 
in the industrialized world are predominantly fossil fuels. Rather the 
court would determine what are reasonable GHG emissions at a given 
time and thus any emissions in excess would be negligent. This negli-
gent portion of Canada's GHG emissions are the result of Canada 
permitting emissions ofGHGs in excess of what is reasonable- breach-
ing the standard of care owed to Palau - and it is this portion of the 
global commons for which Canada is liable. 
3. Causation 
Establishing causation or cause in fact is the third component neces-
sary to prove negligence. Negligence law typically uses the "but for" test 
from M'Alister (or Donoghue) v. Stevenson74 to determine causation -
but for the snail in the plaintiffs ginger beer, she would not have been 
sick. The plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct caused the 
harm experienced by the plaintiff. In other words the burden is on the 
plaintiff to prove causation. Therefore the necessary question is but for 
the GHG emissions from Canada, would Palau still have experienced 
climate change-induced impacts? 
Palau would need to first establish that the sea-level rise and extreme 
weather impacts experienced are the result of human-induced climate 
change and not the result of natural climate variability and secondly, that 
Canada's GHG emissions caused this climate change. Given that the 
balance of probabilities standard (50% + 1) is to be applied, science will 
likely be able to establish a sufficient correlation that climate change 
was due to human activities. Therefore, causation hinges on the second 
issue. Since Canada's contribution in 1998 was only 1.9% of global 
fossil fuel GHG emissions,75 it cannot be said that in the absence of 
Canada, Palau would not have experienced any sea-level rise or extreme 
weather impacts. Palau would have still been affected by climate change 
impacts because the remaining nations of the world would still have 
caused increases in the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. 
As a result, Palau clearly fails the "but for" test in establishing Canada's 
liability. However, courts have recognized exceptions to the "but for" 
test. 
74 [1932] AC 562 (HL). 
75 Supra note 18. 
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Exceptions to the "but for" test have been successful in cases where 
there are multiple negligent defendants. In Corey v. Havener76 a horse 
pulling a carriage was frightened when two motor vehicles simulta-
neously came up behind and passed the animal on either side at high 
speed. The carriage tipped resulting in personal injuries to the occu-
pants. The court barred each of the defendants from using the "but for" 
test against each other - for example, saying that "the horse would still 
have been frightened even without my negligent conduct". A further 
exception to causation occurred in a case where the plaintiff was 
wounded through the negligent conduct of one of two defendant hunters 
but could not identify which defendant actually caused the injmy.77 In 
this case, the court shifted the burden to each defendant to prove that his 
conduct could not have caused the plaintiffs injury.78 
In the seminal case of Sindel! v. Abbott Laboratories et al., 79 the 
critical issue was whether the defendants, which were pharmaceutical 
companies, could be found liable based on their percentage share of the 
marketplace where a plaintiff cannot identify which specific manufac-
turer produced the drug that caused the harm. The plaintiff was success-
ful in this case because the court adopted the theory of "market share 
liability" by reasoning that "as between an innocent plaintiff and negli-
gent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of injury. "80 
Market share liability may be argued by Palau to establish Canada's 
liability for its percentage contribution to Palau's harm. Market share 
liability has been successfully adopted by courts in Washington,81 
Florida,82 New York83 and Hawaii.84 Though no courts in Canada have 
yet put this theory to practice it has become statutory law in British 
Columbia with the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recove1y 
Act,85 which allows the provincial government to sue tobacco compa-
76 (1902), 65 NE 69 (Mass. S.J.C.). 
77 Summers v. Tice, 199 P .2d I (Calif.S.C. 1948). 
78 J.J. Ortego, Market Share Liability Theory of Product Liability Litigation. (American Law 
Institute - American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education, 1996) 
79 Sindel! v. Abbott Laboratories et al. 607 P2d 924 (Calif.S.C. 1980). 
80 Ibid. at 936. 
81 Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 689 P.2d 368 (Wash.S.C. 1984). 
82 Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So.2d 275 (Fla.S.C. 1990). 
83 Hymnowitz v. Eli Lilzy & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.C.A.); cert denied, 493 U.S. 944 
(1989). 
84 Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717 (1991, Hawaii). 
85 S.B.C. 2000, c. 30. 
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nies by apportioning liability based on the manufacturers' share of the 
market. Therefore, this theory exists in at least two common law juris-
dictions and could very well be one of the "general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations."86 The ICJ could apportion causation to 
Canada for its negligent contribution of GHG emissions to the global 
commons in order to determine liability. Furthermore, because Canada 
ought to have knowledge that the "but for" test is entirely inappropriate 
in the context of climate change, Canada may be barred from invoking it 
as a defence. 
Canada is currently responsible for nearly 2% of global GHG emis-
sions and a portion of that since 1990 may be deemed by the ICJ as 
unreasonable conduct given the evolving state of scientific understand-
ing (see the previous section - Standard of Care). The United States 
courts have been clear that if a plaintiff does not bring 100% of the 
manufacturers before the courts then the plaintiff can still succeed 
though not recover 100% of their damages. 87 Therefore, Canada may be 
responsible for something less than 2% of the damage estimates of 
Palau's impacts. But damage claims from Palau and other members of 
AOSIS may run into the billions of dollars and even a fraction of 2% 
could become a sizable liability. 
4. Damage Compensation 
The objective of any liability claim is to receive compensation for 
the hann suffered. The Chorzow Factory Case provides the objectives 
of damage compensation: 
... reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of 
the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all prob-
ability, have existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in 
kind, or, if this is not possible, payment ofa sum corresponding to the 
value which a restitution in kind would bear. .. 88 
Significant damage is predicted for the small island states of the world. 
While this author has been unable to locate damage cost estimates for 
island states, researchers have estimated that a 0.5 m sea-level rise by 
R6 Supra note 51. 
87 Supra note 83, 84 & 85. A plaintiff's failure to bring all manufacturers to court is not a 
defence, but the plaintiff will be unable to recover I 00 % of the estimated damages. 
RR Chorww Fact01y (l11de11111ity) Case (1928), P.C.I.J., Ser. A., No. 17. 
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2100 could cause cumulative impacts to U.S. coastal property between 
$20 and $150 billion (US$). 89 Estimates for Poland have the cost of sea 
wall construction at $6 billion.90 
Palau would need to demonstrate that real damage has occurred and 
that real costs have been incurred. Examples of impacts from sea-level 
rise include loss of land damages or the costs of seawall construction 
and examples from extreme weather could include loss of life, damage 
to property or economic damages. 
Quantifying an appropriate compensation for Palau's impacts may 
be complicated by the recent developments at Part 2 of the Sixth 
Conference of the Parties (COP) in Bonn in July, 2001. In a draft 
decision, the COP declared its intention to create a new funding compo-
nent on the Global Environment Facility which will "provide financial 
resources to developing country parties, in particular least developed 
and small island developing states" for, inter alia, adaptation activi-
ties.91 Canada, along with the member states of the European Commu-
nity, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland, have jointly 
declared their willingness to collectively contribute US$410 million 
annually by 2005 for this new funding programme.92 In fact, Canada has 
expressed the intention of immediately contributing CAN$ l 0 million to 
"enable the prompt start of this fund."93 This special fund for adaptation 
and other activities has the potential to provide small island states with 
the necessary funds to mitigate, at least partially, their future damages. 
This could reduce Canada's liability for the Tran boundary effects of 
greenhouse gases. However, if Palau's future damages greatly exceed 
any adaptation funding that was actually provided to mitigate damages, 
costly losses will still be realized and liability will still exist. While this 
fund is a promising development, it remains to be seen whether the 
funding available will be anything near the level necessary to offset the 
projected damages. 
89 Supra note 59 at 365. 
90 Supra note 59 at 365. 
91 Review o.fthe Implementation of Commitments and of Other Provisions of the Convention: 
Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Co11fere11ce, FCCC/CP/2001/L.4/Rev. l 
[emphasis added]. 
92 Review of the Implementation of Commitments and of Other Provisions of the Convention, 
FCCC/CP/2001/L.14 
93 Ibid. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
The projections of future sea level rise and increased intensities of 
tropical cyclones as a result of climate change raise complex equity 
issues between rich, developed countries and vulnerable small island 
states. This paper has reviewed the international law of state responsibil-
ity in the context of climate change yet can provide no clear answers. 
While there is a "soft law" duty not to harm the environment of another 
sovereign state, and perhaps this may even be customary law, this 
obligation is without teeth unless compensation for the harm can be 
realized. However, it is uncertain by what liability standard this harm 
could be enforced. 
This paper applies the law of negligence which exists in common 
law jurisdictions with the objective of determining whether Canada 
could be liable on a standard with a greater degree of culpability than 
that of strict or absolute liability. This has the purpose of removing the 
uncertainty of the applicable standard for if one is liable based on 
negligence then they are certainly liable on strict or absolute liability. 
It appears possible that Palau could establish Canada's negligence. 
However, this would require a complex time-dependent analysis of the 
standard of care because of the advancing nature of the scientific under-
standing of the risks of climate change. In addition, the theory of market 
share liability is necessary to establish causation because of the exist-
ence of multiple negligent parties. This would require a tremendous leap 
in the evolution of international law; in North America, market share 
liability jurisprudence is limited to the U.S. and in Canada to a single 
provincial statute. Finally, it is also necessary that Canada continue to 
recognize the jurisdiction of the ICJ - a recognition that is purely 
consensual and can be removed at any time. 
The difficulties in a climate change state liability claim based on 
negligence greatly reduce the likelihood of success of such a claim. 
Nevertheless, international law in this area continues to evolve and the 
potential for future liability is an issue which should not be ignored by 
policymakers. 
